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Note
Healthy Compromise: Reconciling Wellness
Program Financial Incentives with Health
Reform
Heather Baird*
1

Soaring health care expenditures coupled with plummet2
ing insurance coverage suggest something is seriously wrong
with the American health care system. In 2010, President
Barack Obama and Congress responded with the passage of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)—redesigning
the health care system to increase access to affordable health
3
insurance and care for all Americans. One way that the ACA
* J.D. and M.P.H. Candidate 2013, University of Minnesota Law School
and University of Minnesota School of Public Health; B.S.N. 2007 Montana
State University, Bozeman. A heartfelt thank you goes out to Professors Daniel Schwarcz and Amy Monahan for all of their assistance, insight, and time;
the editors and staff of the Minnesota Law Review for their effort and dedication; and to every friend and family member who has patiently tolerated
and encouraged me during these four long years. My parents, Beth and Joseph Baird, deserve special recognition for their truly unconditional love and
support (and for the occasional provision of groceries and other essentials via
interstate mail) throughout this graduate school adventure—I cannot thank
them enough. Copyright © 2013 by Heather Baird.
1. Total health care expenditures in 2011 continued to grow. In 2011,
health care spending totaled $2.7 trillion, which is 17.9% of the Gross Domestic Product. CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURES 2011 HIGHLIGHTS 1,
available at http://www.cms.gov/
Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf; CTR. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2010–2020,
at para. 4, available at http://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and
-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpendData/
downloads/proj2010.pdf (“By 2020, national health spending is expected to
reach $4.6 trillion and comprise 19.8% of GDP.”).
2. In 2010, there were 49.9 million uninsured Americans compared to 45
million uninsured in 2008. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-239, INCOME, POVERTY,
AND HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2010, at 23
(2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/p60-239.pdf.
3. See President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to a Joint
Session of Congress on Health Care (Sept. 9, 2009) (“[Health reform] will provide more security and stability to those who have health insurance. It will
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proposes to control health care costs is through support for em4
ployee wellness program initiatives. While wellness programs
existed prior to the ACA, the Act encourages large employers to
adopt wellness programs as a means to decrease health care
5
costs. These programs control costs by persuading employees
6
to adopt healthier, and hopefully medically cheaper, lifestyles.
Wellness programs may be structured to incentivize partic7
ipation in activities like educational sessions. They may also
be structured to incentivize the attainment of certain health
8
outcomes, like a desirable blood pressure or cholesterol level.
The incentives themselves can be as simple as a gym membership or the opportunity to participate in classes, but they also
9
may be more economically valuable. For example, the ACA potentially more than doubles the premium discount available to
10
participants who achieve desirable health status indicators.
Employers and insurers are now permitted to provide rewards
potentially worth up to 50% of a successful employee11
participant’s health insurance premium. This Note concerns
this type of financially incented program.
12
Curbing health care costs is doubtlessly important. But
wellness programs risk creating unproductive financial barriers
to health care by using health insurance to single out and discriminate against individuals with poor health statuses. This
provide insurance for those who don’t. And it will slow the growth of health
care costs for our families, our businesses, and our government.”).
4. The ACA defines a wellness program as “a program offered by an employer that is designed to promote health or prevent disease.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 300gg-4(j) (Supp. 2012).
5. See Kristin M. Madison et al., The Law, Policy, and Ethics of Employers’ Use of Financial Incentives to Improve Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 450,
451 (2011) (“The [ACA] both reflects and promotes growing interest in employer incentive programs.”).
6. Id. at 453.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(E).
8. See Madison et al., supra note 5, at 451.
9. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(1)(i)–(v), (2)(i) (2006). For example, a wellness plan may encourage preventative care by waiver of copayments for prenatal care or well-baby visits, or provide for economic rewards of up to 20% of
the cost of coverage under the plan in exchange for participating in the program. Id.
10. See Madison et al., supra note 5, at 462.
11. While the ACA prescribes a 30% value limit, it allows the maximum
value to be raised to 50% at the discretion of the Secretaries of Labor, Health
and Human Services, and the Treasury. Id. at 451.
12. See, e.g., Thomas Bodenheimer et al., Confronting the Growing Burden
of Chronic Disease: Can the U.S. Health Care Workforce Do the Job?, 28
HEALTH AFF. 64, 64 (2009).
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Note challenges the popular sentiment that these programs are
a promising solution to the issues of unhealthy employees and
13
expensive health care. It suggests that financially incented
wellness programs are ill-suited to achieve the dual aim of improving health and saving money because the legal and policy
tensions these programs create threaten to undermine the
14
ACA’s goal of promoting health and preventing disease.
Wellness programs structured to incentivize health by
providing financial rewards for healthy outcomes are problematic on two levels. First, the discriminatory nature of the program requirements potentially conflict with existing statutes,
namely, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the
15
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA).
Second, the wellness provisions are in tension with the purpose
of wellness programs generally, as well as with the broader
16
purpose of the ACA. These problems will be exacerbated if the
ACA is successful in increasing the number of employers offering significant financial rewards to healthy employees through
17
wellness programs.
Part I of this Note gives some background on health insurance, discusses wellness programs under HIPAA and the ACA,
and explains the evolution of wellness programs in American
insurance schemes. Part II examines how the ACA’s wellness
provisions conflict with existing laws and how the provisions
are internally inconsistent. Part III concludes with some ideas
about how the ACA’s wellness provisions can be improved to
better balance the statutory objectives of promoting healthy living without unduly burdening the unhealthy. Suggestions include remedying confusing statutory language and taking a
more conservative approach to implementing programs with
significant financial incentives through controlled pilot pro13. See, e.g., Wendy K. Mariner, The Affordable Care Act and Health
Promotion: The Role of Insurance in Defining Responsibility for Health Risks
and Costs, 50 DUQ. L. REV. 271, 299–301 (2012) (describing large employer enthusiasm for wellness programs with incentives for participation). This article
by Mariner ultimately presents a thesis very similar to this Note: that health
insurance is not a good vehicle for health status stratification. Id. at 330. This
Note makes a novel contribution by providing a more detailed and technical
look at wellness programs that discriminate based upon health status factors
using financial incentives while Mariner’s article mainly approaches the problem from higher level insurance theory.
14. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4 (Supp. 2012).
15. See infra notes 73–74, 89 and accompanying text.
16. See infra Part II.C.
17. See Madison et al., supra note 5, at 451.
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grams, rather than granting all employers general permission
(and even encouragement) to proceed.
I. THE STRUCTURE AND FUNCTION OF WELLNESS
PROGRAMS
It is important to understand some basic principles of
health insurance before exploring the problematic nature of
employer wellness programs with financial incentives for
health status attainment. After establishing this foundational
background, this section explains Congress’s purpose for enacting both the ACA and the provision governing wellness programs. This section next contrasts this purpose with that of the
original wellness program regulation under HIPAA. Finally,
this section examines in greater detail the history and evolution of wellness program legislation.
A. A HEALTH INSURANCE PRIMER
Some basic background information about how health insurance works is helpful to understanding wellness programs’
role in the insurance system and how the programs’ financial
incentives can adversely affect the group health insurance
market. Financial incentives are created by discounting the
price of insurance using differential premiums, copayments,
18
and deductibles. A premium is the amount a purchaser pays
for an insurer to assume the risk of the purchaser’s health care
19
expenses while a copayment is a fixed amount a policyholder
must pay at the time he or she receives certain health care ser20
vices. A deductible is the total amount that a policyholder
must pay out-of-pocket before an insurance plan will begin cov21
ering services. While premiums, deductibles, and copayments
are standard elements of most insurance plans, state and fed-

18. Janet L. Doglin & Katherine R. Dieterich, Weighing Status: Obesity,
Class and Health Reform, 89 OR. L. REV. 1113, 1133 (2011).
19. See STEVEN PLITT ET AL., 5 COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D § 69:1 (2012).
20. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 385 (9th ed. 2009).
21. Id. at 475.
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22

eral laws require plans to completely cover certain preventive
23
services without copayments or deductibles.
Private health insurance can be offered either as part of an
24
individual or group plan. Most Americans are covered by
25
group insurance. Group plans are generally provided by an
26
employer. Individual plans are sold to people who do not have
employer insurance either because they are self-employed, unemployed, or because their employer does not provide health
27
insurance benefits. Group plans pool risk among all members—everyone in the group pays the same monthly insurance
premium calculated using an estimation of the average cost of
28
everyone in the group. Individual plans have traditionally
29
been priced using underwriting. Underwriting practices base
30
cost upon the estimated risk of the purchaser. This allows insurers to “issue, decline, or differentially price insurance based
22. The law governing insurance plans depends upon a plan’s structure.
The ACA wellness program provisions are applicable to all types of health insurance. See Lucinda Jesson, Weighing the Wellness Programs: The Legal Implications of Imposing Personal Responsibility Obligations, 15 VA. J. SOC.
POL’Y & LAW 217, 241–42, 245–46 (2008), for a concise explanation about
when insurance plans are subject to state versus federal law.
23. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(1) (Supp. 2012) (listing the mandatory covered
services to include “A” or “B” rated services as designated by the United States
Preventive Services Task Force, certain immunizations, certain preventative
services for infants and children, and certain women’s preventative services);
CCH, 2010 TAX LEGISLATION: PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE,
HEALTH CARE RECONCILIATION, HIRE, AND OTHER RECENT TAX ACTS ¶ 530
(CCH Editorial Staff eds., 2010); Jesson, supra note 22, at 241–42 (describing
common state coverage requirements). Two examples of preventive services
include screening for abdominal aortic aneurisms in smokers, and screening
and counseling for childhood obesity. U.S. PREVENTATIVE SERVICES TASK
FORCE A & B RECOMMENDATIONS, http://www.uspreventiveservicestask
force.org/uspstf/uspsabrecs.htm (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (listing mandatory
coverage services).
24. Anne Maltz, Health Insurance 101, in INSURANCE LAW 2007: UNDERSTANDING THE ABC’S 263, 272 (PLI Litig. and Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Ser. No. 11214, 2007).
25. See Mark V. Pauly & Bradley Herring, Risk Pooling and Regulation:
Policy and Reality in Today’s Individual Health Insurance Market, 26 HEALTH
AFF. 770, 770 (2007).
26. See id. at 771.
27. See id. at 771–72.
28. Amy B. Monahan, Health Insurance Risk Pooling and Social Solidarity: A Response to Professor David Hyman, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 325, 326 (2008).
29. Allison K. Hoffman, Three Models of Health Insurance: The Conceptual Pluralism of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L.
REV. 1873, 1885 (2011).
30. Id.

2013]

HEALTHY COMPROMISE

1479
31

on an individual’s prior health experience or expected risk.”
32
Group plans pool risk more effectively than individual plans.
Large groups distribute risk better than small groups because
33
the risk is spread among more individuals. A final unique
characteristic of group, as opposed to individual, health insurance is that group health insurance receives a significant fed34
eral tax subsidy. In 2007, the Joint Committee on Taxation
estimated there was more than $245 billion in tax expenditures
35
associated with the current health insurance tax scheme.
The ACA makes significant changes to the structure of the
American health insurance system. After 2014, in order to
avoid a fine, all Americans above a threshold income level must
obtain insurance coverage, and all businesses with a certain
36
number of employees must provide coverage for their workers.
37
The Act also creates state insurance exchanges. These exchanges increase the opportunity for competitive pricing, informed insurance policy selection, centralized administration,
38
and uniform regulation for individual insurance. The purchase mandate combined with state health insurance exchanges better aggregates the cumulative risk of people seeking indi39
vidual policies; the exchanges create risk pools more akin to
group insurance risk-sharing and also control administrative

31. Id.
32. Id. at 1884–85.
33. See id.
34. See Fred T. Goldberg, Jr. & Susannah Camic, Tax Credits for Health
Insurance, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 73, 74–75 (2009), for a summary of the employer health insurance tax subsidy.
35. Id. at 75.
36. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. 2012) (mandating individual coverage); 26
U.S.C. § 4980H(a) (Supp. 2011) (requiring large employers to offer minimal
health care coverage). See generally CCH, supra note 23, at ¶¶ 405, 415, 425
(summarizing and explaining the ACA coverage requirements).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 1396w-3(b) (Supp. 2012).
38. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., FOCUS ON HEALTH REFORM, EXPLAINING HEALTH CARE REFORM: WHAT ARE HEALTH INSURANCE
EXCHANGES? 1 (2009), available at http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/
7908.pdf.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(J) (Supp. 2012) (“By significantly increasing
health insurance coverage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other provisions
of this Act, will significantly reduce administrative costs and lower health insurance premiums.”); Melinda Beeuwkes Buntin et al., The Role of the Individual Health Insurance Market and Prospects for Change, 23 HEALTH AFF.
79, 88 (2004).
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40

costs. The Act also contains medical loss ratio requirements
that strictly limit the proportion of insurer costs that may be
used to contribute to overhead and other administrative ex41
penses. One purpose of these changes is to restructure the individual health insurance market to more closely resemble the
large group market, both in terms of the amount of risk-sharing
happening, and the tight control of underwriting and under42
writing-like practices.
B. WELLNESS PROGRAMS AFTER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT
It is difficult to directly ascertain Congress’s intent in pass43
ing the ACA because of the Act’s meager legislative record.
The partisan discourse that makes up the record reflects the
fact that the ACA was passed through both congressional houses in a sharply divided political environment—leaders agreed
that the health system needed reform, but disagreed when it
44
came to how best to effectuate change. An inquiry beyond the
40. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(J) (“Administrative costs . . . are 26 to 30 percent of premiums in the current individual and small group markets.”); M.
Pauly et al., Individual Versus Job-Based Health Insurance: Weighing the Pros
and Cons, 18 HEALTH AFF. 28, 32–33 (1999) (“The administrative expense . . .
of nongroup insurance [is] often said to be high—as much as half of premiums
. . . —while that of group insurance can fall to about 5 percent in very large
groups.”).
41. In large group plans 85% of the premium cost must be allocated to
health service delivery, while in small group plans and the individual market,
80% of the premium costs must be so allocated. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-18(b)(1)(a)
(Supp. 2012).
42. See Hoffman, supra note 29, at 1887.
43. See Sara Rosenbaum et al., Crossing the Rubicon: The Impact of the
Affordable Care Act on the Content of Insurance Coverage for Persons with
Disabilities, 25 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 527, 554 (2011) (“For a
law whose provisions are highly complex and whose enactment was undoubtedly one of the hardest fought in U.S. history, the [ACA] is remarkably short
on legislative history.”).
44. 156 CONG. REC. E508 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jeb
Hensarling) (“Republicans agree that we must reform health care in America.
The current system is unsustainable, and simply doing nothing is not an option.”); 156 CONG. REC. H2430 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep.
Mike Pence) (“Reject this attempt to fix a government takeover of health care.
Work with us to repeal and start over on health care reform that reflects the
common sense and the common values of the American people.”); 156 CONG.
REC. H2432 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jim Langevin) (“This
Congress is being given a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to fix a broken health
care system that has left millions of families without the coverage and care
they deserve.”); 156 CONG. REC. H2433 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of
Rep. Silvestre Reyes) (“I heard from many El Pasoans who shared their struggles under the current broken health insurance system.”); 156 CONG. REC.
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sparse official record shows that the Act was designed to both
slow health care spending and increase Americans’ healthy
years of life through regulation, preventative care, and health
45
promotion activities. One of the ACA’s central objectives is to
make health care more affordable and accessible to all Ameri46
cans. Implicit in this objective is the significance of the ACA’s
commitment to individuals in poor health—the group facing the
47
most adversity in the traditional health care system.
The remainder of this section describes the current law
governing wellness programs, explains the history of wellness
plan regulation, and concludes with demographic data suggesting wellness programs have the potential to significantly alter
the health insurance landscape after the ACA.
1. The Present State of the Law
Wellness programs were first introduced as an exception
carved out of the antidiscrimination provisions in the Health
48
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). Wellness programs were described in detail in the HIPAA regula49
tions. Most recently, the programs were codified in the ACA
50
with few, yet significant, changes. The ACA defines a wellness
program as “a program offered by an employer that is designed
to promote health or prevent disease that meets the applicable
51
requirements of this subsection.” The ACA recognizes two
types of wellness programs: those that condition rewards on
H2436 (daily ed. Mar. 25, 2010) (statement of Rep. Brian Bilbray) (“It is no secret that the health care system is in need of reform . . . . While we can argue
over many points, there is one issue where there is no debate: we need health
care reform.”); CCH, supra note 23, at 1–2.
45. See generally Gwendolyn Roberts Majette, PPACA and Public Health:
Creating a Framework to Focus on Prevention and Wellness and Improve the
Public’s Health, 39 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 366 (2011) (describing the extent of
congressional consideration of public health issues and Congress’s understanding of the critical importance of health care reform).
46. Id. at 373.
47. Cf. Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 570 (6th Cir.
2011) (“When healthy individuals opt not to buy health insurance, the pool of
insured persons is smaller and less healthy as a whole, thus raising premiums.”); Hoffman, supra note 29, at 1914–22 (discussing “financial security”
policies in the ACA).
48. The HIPAA anti-discrimination provision is explained infra in the text
accompanying notes 73–74.
49. NANCY LEE JONES ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40661, WELLNESS
PROGRAMS: SELECTED LEGAL ISSUES 1–5 (2010).
50. Id. at 1–2.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(A) (Supp. 2012).
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52

health status factors, and those that do not. There are few restrictions on programs that do not condition rewards on health
53
status factors.
A program offering a reward based upon a health status
factor must meet five conditions: (1) the reward must not be
54
more than 30% of the cost of coverage; (2) the program must
“be reasonably designed to promote health or prevent dis55
ease”; (3) eligible individuals must have the opportunity to
56
qualify for the reward annually; (4) the reward must “be made
57
available to all similarly situated individuals”; and (5) materials describing the terms of the program must disclose the
availability of a “reasonable alternative standard” or possibility
of waiver for those for whom it would be impossible or unsafe to
58
achieve the given standard. These requirements are supposed
59
to minimize discrimination against unhealthy individuals. A
closer examination of the first, second, and fourth conditions is
helpful to better understand how the statute operates.
The first condition limits the value of the reward that a
wellness program may offer participants. Even beyond the 30%
of premium cost maximum, the ACA allows the limit to be increased to 50% of the cost of coverage with the approval of the
Secretaries of Labor, Health and Human Services, and the
60
Treasury. Employers may elect to offer this premium differential either as a penalty for people failing to meet a wellness ob-

52. See id. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(B)–(C). Examples of programs that do not condition rewards upon health status factors include a program that pays for a gym
membership, a program that gives a reward for participation in diagnostic
testing, or a program that covers the costs of participation in smoking cessation counseling. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(2)(A)–(B), (D).
53. See id. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(B) (describing the only restriction as the requirement that a program must be “made available to all similarly situated
individuals”).
54. “Cost of coverage” is equal to the total of both employer and employee
contributions to the insurance plan. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A).
55. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (“A program complies with [this provision] if [it]
has a reasonable chance of improving the health of, or preventing disease in,
participating individuals and it is not overly burdensome, is not a subterfuge
for discriminating based on a health status factor, and is not highly suspect in
the manner chosen to promote health or prevent disease.”).
56. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(C).
57. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D).
58. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(E).
59. See Jesson, supra note 22, at 248.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A).
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61

jective or as a discount to people who do. However the differential is formulated, the effect is the same: individuals who are
unable to achieve the standards will pay more for health insur62
ance. In some instances, wellness savings may be significant
enough to completely cover the cost of the employee’s premi63
um.
The second condition provides some assurance that the
program will be designed in a way that actually improves participants’ health. The statute itself states that this condition
ought to be interpreted liberally: the standard is whether “the
program has a reasonable chance” of improving health or pre64
venting disease. The same subsection requires that the program cannot be “overly burdensome,” a “subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status factor” or “highly suspect” in
65
the method chosen to achieve its goal.
The fourth condition requires that the reward be made
available to “all similarly situated individuals.” To satisfy this
condition, the program must provide a “reasonable alternative
standard,” or waiver of the standard, for individuals for whom
achieving the standard is either “unreasonably difficult due to
66
a medical condition” or “medically inadvisable.” The veracity
of this information may be verified from the participant’s phy67
sician, a caveat that significantly curtails the routine use of
68
this exception to casually circumvent cost differentials.
In November 2012, the Secretaries of the Department of
the Treasury, Department of Labor, and the Department of
Health and Human Services issued a proposed regulation gov69
erning wellness programs. The proposed regulations state
that the maximum differential will be maintained at the statu61. See Madison et al., supra note 5, at 459–60 (“[I]t is not clear that all
carrots are created equally, as they can often be reframed easily as sticks. . . .
[T]he effect of a penalty incentive program may be to transform a wage differential into an insurance premium differential.”).
62. Id.
63. Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1603 (2011).
64. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B).
65. Id.
66. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(i)(I)–(II).
67. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(D)(ii).
68. See Mariner, supra note 13, at 285 (noting that a plan may require a
physician’s recommendation for qualification).
69. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health
Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R.
pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–47).
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tory minimum of 30% of the cost of coverage except in the case
70
of smoking. The premium differential for smokers is greater,
71
up to 50% of the total cost of coverage. Further, the proposed
regulations provide detail about what will and will not be considered a reasonable alternative standard for people under the
condition requiring that rewards be made available to “all simi72
larly situated individuals.”
2. The Evolution of Wellness Program Regulation and
Litigation
The regulation of wellness programs was born from an exception to HIPAA group insurance antidiscrimination requirements. HIPAA contains a general prohibition forbidding all
group insurance plans or issuers from discriminating against
73
policyholders based upon health status. This general rule is
subject to an important exception: wellness programs that meet
the requirements set forth in the HIPAA regulations, and now
the ACA, do not have to comply with the antidiscrimination
74
provisions.
75
HIPAA was passed in 1996. It was not until 2006, however, that the regulations promulgating wellness programs were
76
released. In 2007, two bills with provisions highly supportive
of wellness programs and similar initiatives were considered,
77
though neither was enacted. In 2010, the ACA codified the
HIPAA regulations with two important differences: (1) the ACA
raised the reward maximum from 20% to 30% of the total cost
of the premium and added administrative flexibility by allow70. Id. at 70,623–24.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 70,624–25.
73. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(b)(1)(i) (2012); see also Nondiscrimination and
Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg.
75,014, 75,017 (Dec. 13, 2006) (“The HIPAA nondiscrimination provisions generally prohibit a plan or issuer from charging similarly situated individuals
different premiums or contributions based on a health factor.”).
74. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f); see also 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,017 (“The HIPAA
nondiscrimination provisions do not prevent a plan or issuer from establishing
discounts or rebates or modifying otherwise applicable copayments or deductibles in return for adherence to [wellness programs].”).
75. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104–
191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
76. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702.
77. See Majette, supra note 45, at 368. These bills were the Healthy Lifestyles and Prevention America Act, S. 1342, 110th Cong. (2007), and the
Healthy Workforce Act of 2007, S. 1753, 110th Cong. (2007). Id. at 368 nn.20–
21.
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ing the Secretaries to increase this limit to 50%; and (2) the
ACA provided for a ten-state demonstration project extending
the wellness program provisions to individual insurance
79
plans. The ACA also provides grants to small employers without wellness programs to implement “comprehensive workplace
wellness programs” consistent with criteria to be delineated by
80
the Secretary of Health and Human Services.
HIPAA legislative and administrative records elucidate the
underlying purpose of a wellness program exception. The
HIPAA Senate Report says of the programs,
Because of the difficulty of constructing language which allows such
beneficial practices to continue, while prohibiting plan designs and
practices that are intended to discriminate based on health status or
other related factors . . . the legislation expressly allows employee
health benefit plans and health plan issuers . . . to modify premiums,
copayments, and deductibles in return for adherence to [wellness pro81
grams].

The background information introducing the final 2006 HIPAA
regulations provides additional information about the rationale
behind the reward limit, explaining that the purpose of the cap
is “to avoid a reward or penalty being so large as to have the effect of denying coverage or creating too heavy a financial penal82
ty.” The regulations’ background also observes that “[t]he 20
percent limit on the size of the reward in the final regulations
allows plans and issuers to maintain flexibility in their ability
to design wellness programs, while avoiding rewards or penalties so large as to deny coverage or create too heavy a financial
83
penalty . . . .” Initially, proposed regulations suggested lower
percentage choices of 10% and 15%, but after rulemaking comments submitted by employers and the insurance industry the
84
final limit was fixed at 20%. In 2006, premium discounts at
the 20% level potentially generated an average payment differ85
ence of $920 per participant per year. The 2006 Regulations

78. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (Supp. 2012) (30% maximum),
with 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(2)(i) (20% maximum).
79. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(l).
80. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§ 10408(c), 124 Stat. 119, 977 (2010).
81. S. REP. NO. 104-156, at 19 (1995).
82. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the
Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13, 2006).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 75,021.
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emphasize that the “reasonable design” requirement should
be liberally construed, and that there is no need for “a scientific
record that the method promotes wellness to satisfy this stand87
ard.” Ultimately, wellness programs are regulated to ensure
“fewer instances in which [they] shift costs to high-risk individuals, and more instances in which these individuals succeed at
88
improving health habits and health.”
Wellness programs with financial incentives have the potential to clash with anti-discrimination provisions in the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Congress enacted the
ADA to prevent discrimination against people living with a
89
wide variety of disabilities. The ADA states,
90

A covered entity[ ] shall not require a medical examination and shall
not make inquiries of an employee as to whether such employee is an
individual with a disability or as to the nature of the severity of the
disability, unless such examination or inquiry is shown to be job91
related and consistent with business necessity.
92

The ADA does not explicitly mention wellness programs, but
the programs are addressed in the ADA’s legislative history.
The House Report explains that in order to be ADA-compliant,
wellness programs monitoring health status factors such as
weight and cholesterol must be voluntary, confidential, and
may not limit insurance eligibility or prevent professional ad93
vancement. While the legitimacy and scope of wellness pro86. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012).
87. 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
88. Id. at 75,020.
89. See JONES ET AL., supra note 49, at 6–7; see also H.R. REP. NO. 101485, pt. 2, at 22–23 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 304 (“The purpose of the ADA is to provide a clear and comprehensive national mandate to
end discrimination against individuals with disabilities and to bring persons
with disabilities into the economic and social mainstream of American life; to
provide enforceable standards addressing discrimination against individuals
with disabilities, and to ensure that the Federal government plays a central
role in enforcing these standards on behalf of individuals with disabilities. The
ADA defines ‘disability’ to mean, with respect to an individual: a physical or
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual, a record of such an impairment, or being regarded
as having such an impairment.”).
90. A covered entity is defined as a “health plan,” a “health care clearinghouse,” and “[a] health care provider who transmits any health information in
electronic form in connection with a transaction covered by this subchapter.”
45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2011).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(d)(4)(A) (2006).
92. Id.
93. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 51, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
303, 357.
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grams have yet to undergo extensive judicial examination, the
first such case to be heard in federal court involved an allegation of an ADA violation.
The first, and presently only, case to grapple with the
94
ACA’s wellness provisions is Seff v. Broward County. Seff was
a class action lawsuit initiated by past and present employees
of Broward County contesting the legality of a $20 penalty for
95
non-participation in an employee wellness program. The
plaintiff contested the program’s use of a medical examination
96
and questionnaire. The plaintiffs claimed that the penalty violated the ADA by effectively making the examination and ques97
tionnaire compulsory. The court acknowledged that the ADA
creates a safe harbor for wellness programs that meet two requirements: (1) the program must either be a term in a bona
98
fide benefit plan or a plan itself; and (2) the program must be
“based on underwriting risks, classifying risks, or administer99
ing such risks.”
The Seff court found the program met both safe harbor requirements. The court held that the wellness program was
clearly a term in a benefit plan, and may even be considered a
benefit plan unto itself because of the disease coaching and
100
medication cost waiver benefits for participants. The court also held that the program was based on “accepted principles of
risk assessment” both because it collected aggregated data for
analysis using risk classification techniques to develop future
benefit plans, and because it was designed to control risk by
making the insured population healthier, and therefore less ex101
pensive to cover. Seff suggests that courts may be friendly to
wellness programs, at least in the context of the ADA. Wellness
program litigation, however, has yet to be developed and it is
too early to determine how these programs will fare in the
courts.

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

778 F. Supp. 2d 1370 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
Id. at 1371.
Id. at 1371–72.
Id. at 1372.
Id. at 1373–74; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c) (Supp. 2011).
Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373–74; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12201(c).
Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373 n.5.
Id. at 1374.
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3. Trends in Population Health and Wellness Program
Prevalence
In 2005, over 130 million Americans were afflicted with a
chronic condition, and by 2020, this number is expected to in102
crease to 157 million. Spending on chronic illness is estimat103
ed to increase by 42% between 2003 and 2023. The burden of
illness is not evenly distributed across the population: multiple
health determinants—including an aging population and work104
force, an increasingly obese population, wealth, and race—
105
affect who is most likely to experience poor health. Health determinants significantly affect health disparities: over 30% of
adults living below the federal poverty level suffer from activity
limitations related to chronic illness, while only 10% of adults
106
over 400% of the federal poverty level are so afflicted. Moreover, people with poor health statuses—who tend also to be
poorer financially—already pay more for health care in both
raw dollars, and percentage of income, contributed to health
107
care expenditures through deductible and copayment costs.
Considering the deteriorating health of Americans and the
rising cost of care, it is unsurprising that employers are embracing wellness program to control costs and increase worker
productivity. Between 2004 and 2006, the number of large em108
ployers offering employee incentives for healthy behaviors increased from 7% to 19%, and between 2006 and 2007 the number of large employers offering premium differentials as a
109
wellness reward increased. In 2007, almost 40% of employers
without wellness programs reported an intention to pay em-

102. Bodenheimer et al., supra note 12, at 64.
103. Id. at 65.
104. Id. at 65.
105. See, e.g., Nancy E. Adler & Katherine Newman, Socioeconomic Disparities in Health: Pathways and Policies, 21 HEALTH AFF. 60, 60–61, 70 n.60
(2002).
106. ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND., OVERCOMING OBSTACLES TO
HEALTH 21 (2008), available at http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/
reports/2008/rwjf22441.
107. Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination
Approach to Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV.
1159, 1166–70 (2012).
108. A “large employer” is defined as an employer with at least 500 employees. Michelle M. Mello & Meredith B. Rosenthal, Wellness Programs and
Lifestyle Discrimination—The Legal Limits, 359 NEW ENG. J. MED. 192, 192
(2008).
109. Id.
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ployees for biometric wellness achievements within the next
110
three years.
The changes the ACA makes to the American insurance
system, the increasing prevalence of chronic illness, and the
rising popularity of wellness programs together suggest that
wellness programs will have a significant role in the future of
111
American health insurance and health care. The current program structure, however, is self-contradictory and risks exacerbating health disparities rather than improving the health of
the population.
II. THE PROBLEM WITH FINANCIALLY INCENTED
WELLNESS PROGRAMS
This section examines how the current wellness program
regulations create technical and ideological issues with other
regulatory schemes. It first considers how the wellness provisions may conflict with existing law and then examines how the
provisions operate in relation to the ACA.
A. LEGAL ISSUES
Wellness programs with aggressive financial incentives
implicate statutes that protect certain types of people and in112
formation, like the ADA. Additionally, these programs conflict with the original purpose envisioned for them by HIPAA,
and with the overarching goals of the ACA itself.
1. Wellness Programs and the Americans with Disabilities Act
The discriminatory nature of premium differentials based
on health status potentially clashes with the ADA. The ADA’s
legislative history and the United States Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission’s (EEOC) guidance both require that

110. Madison et al., supra note 5, at 451 (citing NAT’L BUS. GRP. ON
HEALTH & TOWERS WATSON, THE ROAD AHEAD: SHAPING HEALTH CARE
STRATEGY IN A POST-REFORM ENVIRONMENT 15 (2011), available at http://
www.thehortongroup.com/Files/41c8e753-70d4-b602-38db
-15481ad7e12d.pdf).
111. See Michelle M. Smith, Making Wellness Programs Work Well, OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH & SAFETY (June 2011), http://ohsonline.com/Articles/2011/
06/01/Making-Wellness-Programs-Work-Well.aspx.
112. While there has been little litigation about these potential issues to
date, this may change in light of the ACA’s push for more wellness programs
with greater financial differentials.
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113

wellness programs be voluntary. The EEOC guidance says a
program is voluntary “as long as an employer neither requires
participation nor penalizes employees who do not partici114
pate.” Wellness programs with aggressive financial incentives
push the boundary between voluntary and coercive. The permissible financial differentials are not minimal and have sub115
stantially increased after the ACA. It is not difficult to imagine that a court could find that a wellness program with
significant financial incentives, although ostensibly voluntary,
in reality functions as a mandatory wellness program, and
thereby runs afoul of the ADA.
116
While the issue has yet to be extensively litigated, as the
incentive differential is permitted to increase, so does the likelihood that a court would strike down a program as incompati117
ble with the ADA. It is difficult to characterize a program as
voluntary when there is a significant financial incentive for
118
participation. The EEOC once promulgated guidance suggesting that a wellness program would be considered voluntary if
119
the inducement did not exceed the 20% limit in HIPAA. This
limit was subsequently withdrawn and replaced with the language, “The Commission is continuing to examine what level, if
any, of financial inducement to participate in a wellness pro120
gram would be permissible under the ADA.” This shift from a
concrete number to a highly subjective standard suggests that
potentially any financial inducement could be considered a violation of the ADA voluntariness requirement.

113. H.R. REP. NO. 101-485, pt. 2, at 75 (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 303, 357; EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, NO. 915-002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: DISABILITY-RELATED INQUIRIES AND MEDICAL EXAMINATIONS OF EMPLOYEES UNDER THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT
(2000), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/guidance-inquiries.html.
114. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, supra note 113.
115. See supra Part I.B.2.
116. But see Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375 (S.D. Fla.
2011) (holding that the county did not violate the ADA by requiring employee
medical examinations and asking health related questions of employees as a
condition of a wellness program).
117. Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 108, at 195; cf. Madison et al., supra
note 5, at 460 n.75 (“The implication is that the EEOC views the provision of
benefits as an appropriate baseline, such that a threat to deprive someone of
these benefits if they refuse to complete a[] [health risk assessment] has the
potential to be coercive, rendering the medical history ‘involuntary.’”).
118. Madison et al., supra note 5, at 460 n.75.
119. JONES ET AL., supra note 49, at 8.
120. Id.
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Opportunities to contest the voluntariness of wellness program participation, and thus challenge program ADA compliance, will increase if Congress or the Secretaries increase the
121
financial incentives to approach the maximum differential.
Exactly where a court, an administrative body, or Congress will
122
draw this line remains to be seen. Nonetheless, it is undeniable that there is a significant difference between the old 20%
limit under HIPAA, and the 30% (and potentially 50%) limit in
the ACA. While the EEOC no longer sets a hard limit, the
Commission’s continued scrutiny suggests that it considers
123
these programs to be a very real threat to ADA compliance.
2. Seff v. Broward County and the Dawn of Wellness Program
Litigation
Seff suggests that many employee wellness programs fit
nicely within the ADA’s safe harbor and are generally con124
sistent with the goals of the ADA. Indeed, most wellness programs are both part of a comprehensive benefits program and
are as intuitively beneficial to participants’ health. Additionally, most wellness programs use established principles of risk
125
assessment as described in Seff : they seek to control risk and
126
cost by making the population healthier. One interpretation
of this is that the ADA will not be a major sticking point in determining the legality of wellness programs with financial in127
centives. But it is also possible that courts will develop a
more nuanced approach to evaluating the interplay between
the ADA and wellness programs as the number of judicial opinions on point grows.
The only factors the Seff court considered when evaluating
ADA compliance were: (1) whether the wellness program was a
term in a benefit program; and (2) whether it was based on ac121. See Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 108, at 195.
122. See id. at 197–98.
123. Id.
124. Seff v. Broward Cnty., 778 F. Supp. 2d 1370, 1375 (S.D. Fla. 2011).
125. Id. at 1374.
126. See Mello & Rosenthal, supra note 108, at 192 (noting that a vast majority of employers believe they could reduce their healthcare costs by “influencing their employees to adopt a healthier lifestyle”).
127. The ADA’s ability to stymie the scope of wellness programs has yet to
be determined: the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has not
taken an official position regarding how the ADA affects wellness programs.
ADA & Gina: Incentives for Workplace Wellness Programs, U.S. EQUAL EMP’T
OPPORTUNITY COMM’N (June 24, 2011), http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/foia/letters/
2011/ada_gina_incentives.html.
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128

cepted risk principles. This analysis forgoes any consideration of voluntariness, whether actual or constructive. The court
observed that “in this case, the program was more benign as
the employee only faced a $20.00 sanction for non-participation,
129
as opposed to being ineligible for coverage.” Perhaps because
of the relatively small $20 penalty for non-participation the
court in Seff assumed voluntariness without explicitly addressing it. The wellness program at issue in Seff is further distinguishable from more aggressive programs in that it applied a
nominal penalty for non-participants, rather than conditioning
130
a price differential upon the achievement of an outcome.
While the holding in Seff tentatively bodes well for the legitimacy of wellness programs under the ADA, the case marks only
the beginning of wellness program litigation. Much remains to
be determined about how more aggressive financially incented
wellness programs may be reconciled with the ADA voluntariness requirement.
B. THE ACA AND HIPAA: DIVERGING APPROACHES
By codifying the HIPAA regulations with a greater reward
limit, the ACA takes a decidedly different approach to wellness
programs. This subsection discusses two important ways wellness programs differ under HIPAA and the ACA. One difference is that by increasing an already generous award maximum, the ACA reflects comfort with increasing the financial
incentive. The other difference lies in the Acts’ contrasting
tones.
While at first glance the difference between a 20% and a
30% reward limit does not appear to be extraordinary, the 50%
increase and the high cost of health insurance premiums make
131
this price variation substantial. For example, in 2009, the average premium for one-person employer-sponsored coverage
132
was $4669. Twenty percent of $4669 is $933.80. Thirty percent of $4669 is $1400.70; a 30% limit therefore deprives a ben128. Seff, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 1373.
129. Id. at 1374.
130. See id. at 1371–72.
131. See Baker, supra note 63, at 1603 (“[I]n some cases the rebate could
easily exceed the employee’s share of the premium.”).
132. BETH LEVIN CRIMMEL, AGENCY FOR HEALTH CARE RESEARCH AND
QUALITY, MED. EXPEND. PANEL SURVEY, STATISTICAL BRIEF #285, EMPLOYERSPONSORED SINGLE, EMPLOYEE-PLUS-ONE, AND FAMILY HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE SELECTION AND COST, 2009, at 1 (2009), available at http://meps
.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st285/stat285.pdf.
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efit recipient of an additional $466 dollars. While the proposed
133
regulations limit the 50% differential to smokers —which is
unsurprising both because smoking might be considered more a
behavior than a health status factor and because underwriting
134
for smoking has been imagined elsewhere in the ACA —these
regulations are only proposed and even if adopted may be
amended by the Secretaries. If the Secretaries should permit
the maximum 50% limit, a $2334 differential would be permissible in the example above. This is $1401 more than would
have been permitted under HIPAA’s 20% limit. Exacerbating
this result is the fact that premium prices have escalated since
135
2009. The cost differential today is even greater.
A differential of $933 is far from inconsequential. Even assuming an annual $933 increase is a benign or justifiable differential for individuals failing to achieve certain health status
indicators, the difference between $933, $1400, and $2334 respectively is significant. And escalating premium prices magnify these sizable percentage-based rewards.
While the programs may be framed to present these dollar
differentials as fair when the money is provided as an extra—a
136
bonus payment for obtaining target health status factors —
widespread adoption of large financial “rewards” would ultimately only serve to increase the amount people with poor
health statuses pay in relation to people with good health sta137
tuses. It is hard to imagine such a differential as a benign
bonus.
133. Incentives for Nondiscriminatory Wellness Programs in Group Health
Plans, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,620, 70,623 (proposed Nov. 26, 2012) (to be codified at
26 C.F.R. pt. 54, 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590, and 45 C.F.R. pts. 146–47).
134. See, e.g., Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111148, § 4004(c)(2)(A), 124 Stat. 545 (2010) (providing for public media campaigns to address smoking cessation); id. § 4201(c)(2)(B)(iii), 124 Stat. 565
(creating grants for community smoking cessation programs).
135. See Nat’l Bus. Grp. on Health, Majority of Large Employers Revamping Health Benefit Programs for 2012, National Business Group on Health
Survey Finds, PR NEWSWIRE (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.prnewswire.com/
news-releases/majority-of-large-employers-revamping-health-benefit
-programs-for-2012-national-business-group-on-health-survey-finds
-128003893.html (“[E]mployers estimate their health care benefit costs will
increase an average of 7.2 % in 2012.”).
136. See Deborah Stone, Protect the Sick: Health Insurance Reform in One
Easy Lesson, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 652, 657 (2008) (“Some plans waive costsharing requirements or give ‘bonuses’ to members who successfully meet
health ‘goals,’ where the goals are risk factors in disguise . . . .”).
137. See Abigail R. Moncrieff, The Freedom of Health, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
2209, 2247 (2011).
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Even accounting for any decrease in health care costs resulting from healthier outcomes due to program incentives, it
would be very expensive for insurers to pay thousands in “bonus” dollars without affecting premiums. Though insurers may
try to control costs by providing smaller awards, they may find
it more attractive to simply increase the entire group’s premium in an amount commensurate with the reward—all individuals in the group would still pay the same premium, but at an
138
inflated price. A policyholder could only decrease his or her
health insurance cost to a level at, or below, the actual group
risk-rated price by demonstrating healthy health status fac139
tors. A cost-conscious insurance plan would likely opt for this
latter scenario where it can both cut costs and reap the benefits
of a healthier risk pool. Once the dollars at stake become significant—arguably, at the 20% level, as they already are—there is
no appreciable difference between financial incentives termed
140
“bonuses” versus “penalties.”
Other differences between HIPAA and the ACA create
helpful contextual clues useful for understanding how the ACA
paints wellness programs in a different light than HIPAA. First
and foremost, HIPAA sought to eliminate health status dis141
crimination from group health plans.
The exception in
HIPAA carved wellness programs out of a general ban on
health status discrimination; this exception, however, is strictly
142
controlled through the wellness provision regulations. Abuse
138. See Wendy K. Mariner, Social Solidarity and Personal Responsibility
in Health Reform, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 199, 221 (2008); Monahan, supra note 28,
at 325 (“[I]nstead of pooling our collective health risks we are creating ways in
which individuals with low health risks can opt out of the risk pool or otherwise receive preferential treatment.”).
139. While this design may cause insurers to risk running afoul of their
mandatory medical loss ratio, it is nonetheless conceivable that they could
strike a balance that results in a premium price that is elevated solely for the
reason that discounts are available to people participating in wellness programs and achieving desirable health status factors.
140. See Mariner, supra note 138, at 221 (“The distinction between rewards
and penalties, however, is often in the eye of the beholder.”).
141. S. REP. NO. 104-156, at 36 (1996) (“Section 101(a)(1)(A) requires
health plan issuers to offer whole group coverage to any group purchaser desiring to purchase coverage. Section 101(a)(1)(B) prohibits employee health
benefit plans and health plan issuers offering group health plans from establishing eligibility, continuation of eligibility, enrollment, or premium contribution requirements based on health status, medical conditions, claims experience, receipt of health care, medical history, evidence of insurability, or
disability.”).
142. See supra notes 48–59 and accompanying text.
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of financially incented wellness initiatives is prevented by limiting the award for wellness program participation to 20% of an
143
individual’s premium cost, along with the other four statuto144
ry requirements. Twenty percent was the highest of the pro145
posed percentages under HIPAA : this limit was intended to
avoid unduly penalizing people who did not participate or failed
146
to meet a health status standard.
These regulatory provisions are supposed to mitigate the
burden of any differential imposed because of an individual’s
147
failure to achieve a health status factor. This protective function stands in stark contrast to the ACA’s “focus on prevention
148
and wellness.” The ACA expressly seeks to expand the role of
149
wellness provisions. It encourages employers to add programs
and to experiment with program design to maximize the incen150
tives for health. And so while HIPAA used the wellness program regulations to reign in potentially harmful discriminatory
practices, the ACA changes tack, embracing wellness programs
and holding them out as a source of innovation to promote
healthier living and cost savings.
C. RECONCILING WELLNESS PROGRAMS WITH THE AFFORDABLE
CARE ACT
In addition to creating conflict with existing statutes, wellness programs are situated at the juncture of several contradictory policies driving the ACA. This section discusses whether
143. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012).
144. Id. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(C)–(E).
145. Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the
Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13, 2006).
146. Id.
147. See Anita K. Chancey, Getting Healthy: Issues to Consider Before Implementing a Wellness Program, 2 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 73, 85–87 (2009).
148. Peter D. Jacobson & Johanna R. Lauer, Health Reform 2010: Incremental Advance or Radical Transformation?, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1289
(2011); see, e.g., Health System Reform: New Health Law Structured to Accelerate Expansion of Wellness, Prevention Programs, BNA: HEALTH INSURANCE
REPORT (Apr. 28, 2010), http://www.lockelord.com/art_bnahealthsystemreform
_2010/ (“The recently enacted health care reform law has created unprecedented opportunities for expanding workplace programs for wellness, disease
prevention, and chronic disease management . . . .” (quoting health care law
attorney Denise Hanna); Majette, supra note 45, at 366 (referring to the ACA
and “the infrastructure that Congress designed to focus on prevention and
wellness.”)).
149. See 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702 (2012); Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. at 75,018.
150. See sources cited supra note 149.
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wellness programs can accomplish their aim of promoting
health and preventing disease in the context of the ACA. This
inquiry is complicated by the fact that articulating the precise
purpose of the ACA is difficult due to its diverse provisions and
the complex health care landscape that the law transforms.
This section presents two frameworks useful for considering
health policy and analyzes wellness programs using these
frameworks.
1. Frameworks for Conceptualizing Wellness Programs
Facially, wellness programs are an interesting experiment
in cost control. Practically, however, their presence as an exception to the HIPAA antidiscrimination provisions meshes
contradictory policies and creates suboptimal results. Two
frameworks for considering health reform that are particularly
useful for analyzing the contradictions of wellness programs include: (1) comparing social solidarity and personal responsibil151
ity ideologies; and (2) comparing the individualist paradigm
152
and the public health paradigm.
Social solidarity reflects “goals of mutual aid and sup153
A social solidarity approach to health insurance is
port.”
characterized by a system where people of all health statuses
154
pay the same for health care coverage. In many ways, group
health insurance typifies social solidarity because all employees
are offered coverage at the same premium price, even though
certain individuals will predictably incur greater health care
155
costs because of their health status, age, or other factor. Personal responsibility reflects that individuals carry different
health risks and that individuals are not responsible for the
156
risk of others. An example of personal responsibility is an individual health plan that prices or makes coverage determinations according to the type and amount of risk posed by a par157
ticular individual.

151. See Mariner, supra note 138, at 201–08.
152. See generally Micah L. Berman, A Public Health Perspective on Health
Care Reform, 21 HEALTH MATRIX 353, pt. 1 (2011) (arguing that the ACA reflects an “individualist/biomedical paradigm” of preventive health).
153. Mariner, supra note 138, at 205.
154. Id. at 206.
155. Id. at 207.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 207–08.
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Wellness programs put these two approaches directly at
odds. The group insurance setting embodies social solidarity
because all individuals in the group pay the same premium.
The group’s premium is set by the collective risk of the group,
thereby assuring everyone coverage even though the premium
is more expensive than if the group was composed of a very
healthy risk pool. However, wellness programs create a price
differential based on a group member’s individual health
158
risk. Wellness programs may target factors like blood pressure, weight, and cholesterol level—the very same factors that
159
are used to set premium rates. This creates a scenario where
“wellness programs reintroduce the very risk rating that
160
[HIPAA] . . . initially forbade.” While this is tempered somewhat by the requirement that wellness programs incorporate
161
alternatives for people unable to meet the standards, the
wellness provisions act as a proxy for pricing by underwrit162
ing. The overall effect is to introduce stratification into the
group market in a way that very much resembles the troubled
163
individual market.
The individualist paradigm and the public health paradigm are useful for exploring another dimension of wellness
programs. The individualist paradigm has a biomedical component—the belief that medical research identifies the source and
often the solution to health problems—and the idea that an in164
dividual is responsible for his or her own health. The public
health paradigm takes a “population-based perspective” to
health and examines the social and environmental factors that
165
cause variations in health status.
Health promotion and improved health status outcomes
are wellness program objectives consistent with the public
health model in the abstract. But realistically, wellness pro166
grams are more a product of the individualist model. Wellness programs’ assumption that an individual’s level of motivation is the primary barrier to health and that this motivation
158. Id. at 217.
159. See id. at 222.
160. Id.
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(E) (Supp. 2012).
162. See Mariner, supra note 138, at 222.
163. Id. at 225–26.
164. Berman, supra note 152, at 356–57.
165. Id. at 360–61.
166. Cf. Berman, supra note 152, at 377 (explaining how the increase in
reward limit threatens to worsen workplace inequities).
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can be influenced by financial incentives considers almost none
of the social and environmental factors that affect health sta167
tus. A narrow conception of health determinants disparately
impacts sub-populations already bearing a disproportionate
168
burden of illness and disease. Wellness programs, as present169
ly described in regulatory and statutory language, are not
adequately designed to account for the complexities of health
170
disparities, such as low socioeconomic status. When the most
important determinants are excluded from the calculation, the
result is to exacerbate disparities rather than improve
171
health. Those individuals “most likely to be subject to wellness program requirements may be those who need insurance
172
the most and can least afford higher costs.” This result is neither intended nor desirable.
2. Tension in the Statutory Language
The language in the ACA’s wellness program provisions
suggests that the aim of the provisions is muddled. If read literally, the statute actually forbids wellness programs from dis173
criminating based on health status. Any wellness plan that
conditions rewards on a health status factor must be “reasona174
bly designed to promote health or prevent disease.” The statute next lists several tests that such a program must satisfy,
including that the program not be “a subterfuge for discrimi175
nating based on a health status factor.” Given that these
wellness provisions exist as an exception to HIPAA’s prohibition against health status discrimination, it is facially anomalous that they simultaneously forbid health status discrimina167. See id. at 377–78; Mariner, supra note 138, at 218–25.
168. See Berman, supra note 152, at 360–61.
169. HIPAA provides an example of a permissible wellness program that
conditions rewards on health status factors. This program provides a 20% discount to employees participating in a wellness program that consists of achieving less than 200 mg/dl on cholesterol test (and meets the other statutory requirements for notice and reasonable alternatives). 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3)
(2012).
170. See generally Berman, supra note 152 (discussing adequacy of wellness program design).
171. See id. at 376.
172. Mariner, supra note 138, at 225.
173. See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(1)(C), (3)(B) (Supp. 2012) (requiring wellness programs that discriminate “based on a health status factor” not be “a
subterfuge for discriminating based on a health status factor”).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B).
175. Id.
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tion. This textual inconsistency raises more than a minor technical issue, especially considering all of the legal and policy
concerns raised by wellness programs that have already been
discussed. The confusing language emphasizes that the aim of
176
the statute is not as lucid as it might initially seem. The language appears to give employer health insurance plans permission to develop wellness programs that charge differential prices based on health status factors, while leaving open the
177
possibility for disputes about the legality of such programs.
Both incentivizing health and providing affordable insurance
coverage for people in poor health are laudable goals, but the
wellness provisions’ attempt to achieve both at once demonstrates that it is tremendously difficult, if not impossible, for
them to coexist in this statute.
D. ADDITIONAL POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Two additional considerations raised by the current conception of wellness programs are worthy of mention. First,
there is a concern that employers will use the programs as an
avenue for designing health insurance plans that preferentially
select the healthy. Second, wellness programs implicate federal
tax policy as it relates to the tax-exempt status of employee
health benefits.
When the ACA is fully implemented, employers may use
wellness programs as a tool both to indirectly attract healthy
employees into their workforce and to push unhealthy employees out of the employer plan and into the state health insur178
ance exchanges. One way to achieve this risk selection is for
employers to provide wellness incentives at the maximum al179
lowable financial reward. When it comes to recruiting potential employees, an aggressive wellness program will tend to at176. Cf. Amy Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine
Health Care Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 167
(2011) (describing the prohibition of wellness programs that are a subterfuge
for discrimination as ineffective and impractical).
177. “Permission” because of the distinction between programs that discriminate on a health status factor, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(B) and (C), as well
as an example of a permissible wellness in HIPAA that conditions financial
rewards on achieving a desirable cholesterol level. 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3)
ex. 3 (2012). A “possibility for disputes about the legality of such programs,”
because the distinction between the aforementioned permissible program that
discriminates based upon a health status factor and a program that does not
discriminate is unclear from the language in both the ACA and HIPAA.
178. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 142–57.
179. See id. at 149.
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180

tract the healthy and repel the unhealthy. Also, wellness
programs’ financial incentives may be used to encourage employees in poor health to seek health insurance in the exchang181
es rather than through the employer. This effect would be
magnified as the differential awarded for a desirable health
status increases.
Wellness programs also generate a tax policy consideration
arising from the substantial federal tax subsidy received by
182
employer-sponsored health plans. An essential function of
employer-sponsored health insurance is to pool risk in a group,
making health coverage accessible and affordable to everyone
183
in the group, regardless of health status. While this tax subsidy probably exists more for historic reasons than equitable
184
ones, justification for its continued existence hinges at least
in part on the added incentive for employers to offer health
185
benefits. The employer group market is generally considered
successful when compared to the individual market because it
186
pools risk and then spreads it evenly. This risk-spreading is
most beneficial to individuals likely to have poor health—for
187
instance, persons of lower socioeconomic status. High income
individuals, however, are more likely to have tax-exempt group
188
insurance plans. When the group insurance market engages
180. This is a type of “risk classification by design.” Risk classification by
design refers to the calculated construction of health insurance policies engineered to attract a healthier than average population. See Baker, supra note
63, at 1589; see also Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 146–47.
181. Wellness programs are just one piece of a complicated incentive structure that an employer may create to encourage employees with poor health
statuses to seek health insurance outside of the employer-sponsored program.
Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 158–71.
182. Money paid towards employer sponsored health plans is exempt from
income taxation. See Goldberg & Camic, supra note 34, at 174.
183. Baker, supra note 63, at 1595.
184. See William P. Kratzke, Tax Subsidies, Third-Party-Payments, and
Cross-Subsidization: America’s Distorted Health Care Markets, 40 U. MEM. L.
REV. 279, 285 (2009) (describing the origin of employment-based health insurance as “an historical accident”).
185. See Allison K. Hoffman, Oil and Water: Mixing Individual Mandates,
Fragmented Markets, and Health Reform, 36 AM. J.L. & MED. 7, 55 (2010) (describing how tax law augments risk-pooling in group markets).
186. Hoffman, supra note 29, at 1884–85.
187. See Adler & Newman, supra note 105, at 60–61, 70 n.60.
188. J. Paul Singleton, Can You Really Have Too Much of a Good Thing?:
How Benevolent Tax Policies Have Attributed to the Explosion of Health Care
Costs and How New Policies Threaten to do More of the Same, 8 DEPAUL BUS.
& COM. L.J. 305, 332 (2010) (“[U]sing pre-tax dollars to save for health insurance is not a benefit for the 36.3% of Americans who, as of 2008, did not owe
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in risk stratification, thereby behaving more like the troubled
pre-ACA individual market, the equity problem with such a
large and unevenly distributed tax subsidy becomes increasing189
ly unjustifiable.
III. BUILDING A BETTER STATUTORY SCHEME FOR
WELLNESS PROGRAMS
The implicit message in wellness programs, that people
must take responsibility for their own health, may have a
prominent role to play in the future of the American health
190
care system, but the legal and policy problems presented by
wellness programs raise the question of whether these programs are an appropriate avenue for health promotion and disease prevention. The remainder of this Note suggests that in
order to establish clearer and fairer objectives, the wellness
program statutory language must be amended to: (1) clarify
which types of wellness programs are permissible under the
statute; and (2) relax the financial pressure to achieve health
status factors.
A. INTERPRETING STATUTORY LANGUAGE
The language in the ACA’s wellness provisions should be
amended to prevent the law from contradicting itself. As the
law is presently formulated, even though wellness programs
are designated as an exception to HIPAA’s health status antidiscrimination provisions, the wellness provisions themselves
prohibit the programs from discrimination based upon health
status. This contradiction could be avoided by removing the
language, “is not a subterfuge for discriminating based on a
health status factor” from 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp.
2012). The subsection would then state that a program is reaany income tax at the end of the year. Moreover, low-income tax payers are
the least likely to be able to afford the rising costs of health insurance. The tax
exclusion, then, would provide relatively little benefit to these households even
if their marginal tax rate exceeded zero. Ultimately, this exclusion is little
more than a subsidy for the wealthy who receive generous employer-provided
health insurance, while those most in need of assistance receive no comparable
subsidy through the exclusion.” (emphasis added)).
189. Cf. Monahan & Schwarcz, supra note 176, at 142 (“In contrast to insurers in the individual market, most employers engaged in relatively little
risk classification prior to ACA. For this reason, ACA does little to alter the
risk-classification landscape with respect to employers.”).
190. For a discussion about the responsibility to be as healthy as you can,
see Baker, supra note 63, at 1602–06.
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sonably designed to promote health or prevent disease “if the
program has a reasonable chance of improving the health of, or
preventing disease in, participating individuals, and it is not
overly burdensome and is not highly suspect in the method
191
chosen to promote health and prevent disease.”
This change would certainly not remove all ambiguity but
it would eliminate a facial contradiction. A plaintiff challenging
the nexus between a wellness program and its reasonable
chance of improving participants’ health must make a factintensive case. This standard sets an especially high bar for the
plaintiff because the administrative guidance acknowledges
that this nexus does not have to be grounded in sound scientific
192
evidence. Furthermore, it is well within a court’s ability and
experience to evaluate whether a program is overly burdensome or highly suspect in its method. Under this new construction, a wellness program conditioning financial rewards on
health status factors can indisputably qualify for the antidiscrimination exception and be judged to be neither overly burdensome nor highly suspect in its method—a difficult determination under the current statutory language.
It is a trickier piece of statutory interpretation to reconcile
the current wellness program exception to HIPAA’s antidiscrimination provisions with a prohibition on acting as a subterfuge for discrimination. It is also unnecessary. This prohibition
does not add anything to the statute except an inconsistency
that could be used to challenge any wellness program conditioning rewards on health status factors. Congress did not intend this result as evidenced by the statutory wellness provisions’ examples of acceptable programs that condition rewards
193
on health status factors.
Perhaps Congress intended the word discrimination to
have different meanings in HIPAA and the ACA. It is probably
possible to construct a definitional distinction between the use
of discrimination in the two contexts. Alternatively, simply
eliminating the requirement that a program not be a subterfuge for discrimination would remove this contradiction and allow programs to be developed as Congress intended. Requiring
191. 42 U.S.C. § 300 gg-4(j)(3)(B) (Supp. 2012).
192. See Nondiscrimination and Wellness Programs in Health Coverage in
the Group Market, 71 Fed. Reg. 75,014, 75,018 (Dec. 13, 2006).
193. See, e.g., 29 C.F.R. § 2590.702(f)(3) ex. 3 (2012) (permitting a wellness
program that provides a “premium rebate” for participants who obtain a
healthy cholesterol level).

2013]

HEALTHY COMPROMISE

1503

a program to not be overly burdensome, or highly suspect in its
methods, probably provides a comparable check on overly aggressive wellness programs. Striking this language would make
the statute better reflect Congress’s purpose and avoid unnecessary litigation over statutory ambiguity. While this textual
fix addresses some technical inconsistencies, Congress’s conflicted relationship with health status discrimination is indicative of a larger paradox posed by post-ACA wellness programs
that is addressed next.
B. THE IMPORTANCE OF EASING THE ECONOMIC PRESSURE OF
WELLNESS PROGRAMS
Presently, there are too many incentives for employers to
implement wellness programs with an aggressive financialrewards structure and not enough evidence to support the efficacy of these programs. These incentives could exacerbate
health and economic disparities by making health care coverage more expensive for the people who need money and coverage most.
An important counterargument is that this critique of
wellness programs assumes that the programs do not actually
194
decrease the cost of health insurance. If the programs are
successful then the cost-savings may be passed along to policyholders of all health statuses. If cost-savings via improved
health status are both substantial enough and returned to policyholders (as opposed to being absorbed administratively or
distributed as profits), then theoretically, everyone in a group
health insurance plan could pay enough less that wellness program premium price differentials will function as genuine bonuses. If the programs are truly this effective, people with poor
health statuses may benefit from wellness programs despite
any differential pricing because of systemically lower health insurance costs. Assuming that wellness programs that account
for health status can decrease health insurance premium prices
enough to offset any reward, the ACA’s support for increased
pricing differentials may nonetheless benefit policyholders with
poor health statuses.
194. Cf. Ezra Klein, The Promise and Peril of Wellness, WONKBLOG (Oct.
16, 2011, 9:00 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/the
-promise-and-peril-of-wellness/2011/08/25/gIQAGzPfkL_blog.html (discussing
how spending on employee health care decreased after the implementation of
a comprehensive wellness program, including differential premium pricing
based upon health status, at the Cleveland Clinic).
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To address this counterargument, the effectiveness of financially incented wellness programs must be evaluated. Evaluation considerations include the length of wellness program
implementation before evaluation, the demographics of the insured population pre- and post-wellness program, and of course
determining the appropriate metrics to measure cost and
195
health status. Alone, these variables are moving targets. It is
a daunting task indeed to combine them into an accurate
measure of wellness program effectiveness.
This Note does not opine upon the effectiveness of wellness
programs beyond making the observation that implementation
is in its infancy and program evaluation and comparative effec196
tiveness analysis is far from established. Keeping this in
mind, a conservative approach to the creation of programs with
financial incentives is warranted. Policymakers should be hesitant to tamper too much with the heavily-subsidized large
group insurance market that has been traditionally adept at
risk-spreading.
The ACA’s increase in permissible financial rewards
should be scaled back considering the rapidly rising premium
costs and the potential for a difference of thousands of dollars
197
between what healthy and unhealthy group members pay. As
premium prices escalate, even HIPAA’s 20% cap may be excessive. A 10% to 15% limit would still allow employers to provide
hundreds of dollars in savings to incentivize employees to
achieve healthier outcomes and be less likely to cause excessive
198
financial strain. This precise limit is admittedly somewhat
arbitrary, but it better reflects a conservative approach without
eliminating the programs entirely. A more stringent limit on
the magnitude of incentives decreases the potential for wellness programs to exacerbate existing disparities (albeit, with a
corresponding weakened incentive for successful wellness program participation), but still fails to address the problem artic195. See, e.g., Katherine Baicker et al., Workplace Wellness Programs Can
Generate Savings, 29 HEALTH AFF. 1, 2 (2010), available at http://content
.healthaffairs.org/content/29/2/304.full (describing some of the methodological
difficulties in evaluating wellness programs).
196. Madison et al., supra note 5, at 453. See generally Mariner, supra note
13, at 304–05 (explaining some of the methodological challenges in evaluating
wellness programs).
197. See supra notes 131–35 and accompanying text.
198. Wellness incentives should not impose an “undue burden” under 42
U.S.C. § 300gg-4(j)(3)(A) (Supp. 2012), though no objective measure or further
guidance is provided to clarify what this precisely means.
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ulated by the public health paradigm: health status is the
product of more variables than and individuals’ motivation to
be healthy.
One alternative to capping the financial incentive at 15% of
the premium price would be to require employers with greater
199
financial incentives to participate in pilot programs. Employers using wellness programs with incentives beyond 15% of the
purchase price could be required to systematically collect data
used to monitor the efficacy of the program over time. These pilot programs could be used to explore and compare the effectiveness of financial rewards of up to 50% of the purchase price.
When there is evidence to indicate that programs with greater
rewards are effective enough to return net savings to the group,
the time will be ripe for broad application of the ACA’s wellness
200
provisions. Until then, the best and fairest option when introducing risk stratification into the employer insurance market is the conservative one.
CONCLUSION
At first glance, wellness programs seem like an innocuous
and innovative way to incentivize people to improve their
health. Upon closer examination, however, the issue is more
complex. The manner in which the ACA has structured and
promoted these programs creates cause for concern on numerous levels. Wellness programs struggle to marry the competing
ideologies of health promotion through financial incentives and
expanded and equitable access to affordable health care. The
statute’s attempt to do so creates a great deal of tension with
existing laws and policies both internal and external to the
statute. Additionally, the wellness provisions’ failure to
acknowledge the complexity of health status determinants
while increasing the economic pressure to participate in wellness programs is concerning. There is a strong possibility that
the ACA’s wellness program framework will upset the relative
stability of the group insurance market by exacerbating both
health and economic disparities rather than improving health
and preventing disease. The financial incentives provided by
199. Cf. id. § 300gg-4(l)(1) (providing for a ten-state demonstration project
piloting wellness programs in state individual markets).
200. Cf. id. § 300gg-4(l)(2) (providing for the expansion of the ten-state individual market wellness program demonstration project if the Secretaries of
Health and Human Services, the Treasury, and Labor determine that the
demonstration project is effective).
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wellness program should be reined in, rather than expanded, to
prevent burdening the marginalized populations that the ACA
is supposed to assist, at least until a more realistic assessment
of the actual effect of the widespread implementation of these
programs is possible.

